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Abstract 
We investigate whether taking an oath in a survey situation affects respondent behavior in 
choice experiments with a focus on travel time, comfort, and cost. We conduct two studies in 
Beijing: one with car commuters and one with public transport commuters. Overall, we find 
little difference in behavior between responses with and without an oath. In fact, the only 
difference is that responses are more internally consistent in the version with an oath script: 
the respondents trade off money in terms of a fuel cost and in terms of a congestion charge in 
the same way. However, there is no statistically significant effect on marginal willingness to 
pay for any of the attributes. 
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1. Introduction 
The use of stated preference (SP) methods has a long tradition in transport economics. There 
are many reasons for why SP methods are used, but perhaps the most important is that they 
are the only methods that in a convincing way can measure a value of a non-existing good or 
of a change in the quality of an existing good. They are also the only methods that can 
measure non-use values in a direct way. At the same time, the main criticism against SP 
methods is that they measure stated choices/behavior and not actual choices/behavior 
observed in the market. The difference between stated willingness to pay (WTP) and the 
corresponding WTP if the payment were for real is often denoted hypothetical bias in the 
literature. Public goods and non-use values are the major explanations of why hypothetical 
bias occurs (List and Gallet, 2001). Although the findings are mixed, there is considerable 
evidence that WTP estimates are higher in SP than in the corresponding real setting; see for 
example Cummings et al. (1995), Cummings et al. (1997), and Frykblom (1997), and as well 
as List and Gallet (2001) and Murphy et al. (2005) for meta analyses. In the area of transport, 
there are also a few studies investigating the difference between stated and real choices/WTP. 
Hensher (2010) investigated the difference between revealed and stated preferences captured 
in three different choice experiment (CE) studies on transport mode and ticket type choices 
and found no evidence of hypothetical bias. Swärdh (2008) found a weak but not statistically 
significant tendency of positive hypothetical bias in WTP for travel time reductions. 
However, using information from a follow-up certainty question, he found that this 
hypothetical bias was only evident for non-certain subjects. Fifer et al. (2014) found a positive 
hypothetical bias comparing stated and revealed preferences for a kilometer-based charging 
scheme. One interesting finding in transport is that a set of studies actually find a negative 
hypothetical bias for value of time, i.e. that people state a lower WTP in a study than what 
they would pay for time savings in a real situation; see Brownstone and Small (2005), 
Isacsson (2007), and Hultkrantz and Xue (2010). There are several explanations for this 
perhaps surprising finding. One is that people have the wrong perception of travel time, in 
particular when they face unexpected delays, e.g., a delay of five minutes could be perceived 
to be much longer. However, in a stated preference setting, five minutes would be perceived 
as five minutes. Another explanation could be that time constraints are not fully attended to in 
a stated preference setting, i.e., respondents do not carefully enough consider what their 
alternative use of time is.  
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If we disregard studies looking at the environmental impacts of transport, it is fair to say that 
SP studies in transport economics to a much lesser extent involve public goods and non-use 
values. Furthermore, the main interest in many of the studies in transport economics is in 
estimating marginal trade-offs among the attributes, often the marginal value of time. 
Estimates of marginal trade-offs are considered to be less prone to differences between stated 
and real behavior (Carson and Groves, 2007). We should perhaps therefore expect the 
discrepancy between stated and real behavior to be lower in SP studies in transport economics 
than in fields such as environmental and health economics. However, one type of SP study in 
transport is likely to trigger rather strong attitudes and thus implies a higher risk of ending up 
with a difference between stated and real behavior: those that involve infrastructure 
investment, and in particular congestion charge systems; see Li and Hensher (2012) for an 
overview of stated preference studies on congestion charges and car use.  
 
Several strategies have been developed to reduce the hypothetical bias in SP studies, 
including: (i) follow-up certainty questions (Champ et al., 1997; Champ and Bishop, 2001), 
(ii) cheap talk scripts (Cummings and Taylor, 1999; Carlsson et al., 2005), (iii) consequential 
scripts (Bulte et al., 2005; Vossler and Evans, 2009; Barrage and Lee, 2010), and (iv) time-to-
think protocols (Cook et al., 2007; Whittington et al., 1992). The cheap talk script is probably 
the most frequently used one. The underlying idea of the script is that, by informing 
respondents about hypothetical bias, they become less prone to it. The observed effect of the 
cheap talk script varies among studies and its success seems to depend on the characteristics 
of the good, the length of the script, and the valuation method (see Aadland and Caplan, 2003, 
2006; Carlsson et al., 2005; Cummings and Taylor, 1999; List, 2001; and Murphy et al., 
2005). A more recent approach for addressing hypothetical bias is the use of an oath script. 
Jacquemet et al. (2013), Carlsson et al. (2013), and Stevens et al. (2013), all found lower 
WTP values in treatments with oath compared with treatments without oath. De-Magistris and 
Pascucci (2014) is the only study we are aware of that investigate the role of an oath in a 
choice experiment setting. They found that taking an oath results in lower marginal WTP 
estimates.1 With an oath, respondents are asked to swear (or promise) to answer truthfully, 
mimicking the act of taking an oath in a courtroom. According to social psychology research, 
it is not enough to only inform people about bad behavior (as is the case with the cheap talk 
                                                          
1  There are also experimental studies looking at other types of behavior and oath. For example, a recent study by 
Jacquemet et al. (2015) found that taking an oath increased a person’s willingness to tell the truth in an 
experimental study. 
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script). In addition to this information, people also need to commit to the task in order to 
change their behavior (see, e.g., Joule et al., 2007). Thus, promising to answer truthfully or 
signing an oath before the respondent participates in a stated preference study is an attempt to 
use commitment theory to reduce hypothetical bias. 
 
We conducted two studies related to commuting: one directed to car commuters and one to 
public transport commuters. Both studies were conducted in Beijing, China, which is a city 
with substantial traffic and air quality problems (Creutzig and He, 2009; Hao and Wang, 2005; 
Westerdahl et al., 2009). The objective of the present paper is to investigate the effect of an 
oath script on respondent behavior in a transport-related choice experiment with a focus on 
travel time, travel comfort, and travel cost. Carlsson et al. (2013) found that share of zero 
WTPs as well as extremely high WTPs decreased among Chinese respondents who took an 
oath in a contingent valuation (CVM) survey. We are therefore interested in investigating 
whether individuals who take an oath will make more careful choices and take all available 
attributes into account.  
 
We are not aware of any other study that has tested whether a commitment in the form of an 
oath matters for stated choice and WTP in transport-related choice experiments. As for the 
effect of taking an oath on people’s behavior, however, a few studies can be discerned and 
most of them are experimental studies.. Jacquemet et al. (2013) investigate the impact of an 
oath script in two laboratory experiments: one induced value second-price auction and one 
homegrown value second-price auction. Both experiments had three treatments: a 
hypothetical, a real setting with monetary incentives, and a hypothetical with the option of 
signing an oath before participating. By signing the oath, subjects agreed to “swear on their 
honor” to tell the truth and provide honest answers. The authors found that subjects who took 
the oath were on average less likely to overstate or understate their bids; that is, the variance 
of bids was reduced. They also found that the hypothetical payment treatment with the oath 
outperformed both the hypothetical non-oath treatment and the real payment treatment. The 
authors also discussed possible reasons for why signing an oath helps reduce/correct the 
hypothetical bias and concluded that an oath increases the willingness to tell the truth due to a 
strengthening of the intrinsic motivation to do so. A second experimental study by Jacquemet 
et al. (2017) compared voting behavior in real and hypothetical referenda and found that the 
oath script eliminated hypothetical bias. A third experimental study by the same authors 
(Jacquemet et al., 2014) investigated the effect of an oath script in a classic coordination game 
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(with senders and receivers) in a laboratory setting. Here the authors found that taking an oath 
increases optimal coordination by nearly 50 percent. Senders were more likely to send 
informative and reassuring messages and then do what they said they would. More receivers 
trusted the messages received under an oath than without it. Finally, the fourth experimental 
study is Stevens et al. (2013), who compared WTP across three treatments: two hypothetical 
that were followed by an actual payment and one with an actual payment only. The difference 
between the first two treatments was that before the second treatment started, the participants 
were asked to sign an oath. Their results show that with an oath, mean hypothetical payments 
did not differ from mean actual payments. 
 
We are aware of only two stated preference studies that investigate the effect of an oath script. 
The first is Carlsson et al. (2013), who conducted a CVM study about climate change and 
tested whether taking an oath impacts people’s WTP. The study was conducted in both 
Sweden and China. They found that in both countries, the shares of zero and extremely high 
WTP responses decreased when an oath script was used, resulting in lower WTP variance. 
The second is De-Magistris and Pascucci (2014), who found lower marginal WTP in a CE 
with an oath script compared with using a cheap talk script or no script at all.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the two SP studies and 
the oath script used. Section 3 gives a description of the administration of the studies and of 
the sample used. We report the results in Section 4 and discuss the implications of our 
findings in Section 5. 
 
2. Description of the SP studies and the oath script 
We investigate the role of an oath script in two different choice experiments. The purpose of 
the two experiments was to investigate the value of time among car and public transport 
commuters in Beijing and whether taking an oath affects survey responses. For a more 
detailed description of the experiments and their results, see Yin (2017).  
 
Both studies started with the subjects responding to questions about individual and household 
characteristics, as well as a set of questions about commuting by car and public transport. 
Then we elicited their attitudes to existing transport policies by asking them to rate each 
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policy on a scale from 1 to 10.2 After this, the choice experiment was introduced. We started 
the experiment with a cheap talk script and the oath question (not in the control groups). In a 
next step, we described the scenario, which differed between the car and public transport 
studies, and conducted the actual choice experiment. Finally, the respondents were asked a set 
of follow-up questions about attribute attendance.  
 
2.1 Study 1: A choice experiment for car commuters 
A generic choice experiment with 12 choice sets was presented to commuters from 
households that owned a car. In each choice situation, there were two alternative commuting 
schemes, both by car. Each alternative was described with four attributes: travel time in the 
morning, travel time in the afternoon, a congestion charge, and daily fuel cost.  
 
In the present paper, we want to investigate the trade-offs between travel time and cost of 
driving. It is clear from the pilot studies that, for many commuters, travel time reductions in 
the morning are much more important than reductions in the afternoon. Therefore, commuting 
time in the morning and afternoon are included as two separate attributes. Commuting time 
refers only to the time spent in the vehicle, while the walking time, either from home to the 
parked car or from the parked car to work, is not included. We utilized a pivot design where 
the levels of the travel time attributes were based on the current travel time for the 
respondents. The third attribute, congestion charge, is the daily price paid for driving into the 
central city during rush hours. This attribute has four levels ranging from 10 to 25 yuan per 
day. The daily fuel cost is used as the cost attribute as it represents the main expense of 
driving, alongside parking fees or road toll, and applies to all drivers. The levels of the fuel 
cost attribute were also pivoted upon real cost. Table 1 presents the attributes and their levels.  
 
2.2 Study 2: A choice experiment for public transport commuters 
We designed a generic choice experiment for public transport commuters to elicit their 
preferences regarding travel time, level of crowding, and travel cost. There were in total 12 
choice sets, each with two alternatives describing two different public transport commuting 
schemes. Again each alternative was described with four attributes: travel time in the morning, 
travel time in the afternoon, level of crowding, and ticket price. 
                                                          
2 The existing transportation policies include driving day restriction, higher fuel tax, higher parking fee, a lottery 
for new vehicle plates, and low-priced public transport. The value 1 on the scale indicates “this policy does not 
help solve the congestion problem at all” and 10 “this policy is very helpful in solving the congestion problem.” 
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Public transport commuting time referred to the time spent on the bus or subway, or both, and 
as well as the time spent waiting for a transfer. The time an individual spent on the bus and 
the subway, respectively, was not distinguished, as many respondents use both. The levels of 
the time attributes were also pivoted upon current individual travel time. The third attribute 
was level of crowding onboard, expressed as number of days out of ten commuting days 
experiencing severe crowdedness inside the bus or subway car. We assumed there are only 
two states, severely crowded and crowded, since both buses and subway are crowded most of 
the time during peak hours in Beijing. In the survey, all respondents were shown the same two 
photos of different numbers of passengers standing on board. Thus, we believe that 
respondents had a consistent view of what we meant by crowded and severely crowded. 
These photos are shown in the Appendix. The final attribute was the ticket cost of using 
public transport including buses and subway. The level varies from 4 to 10 yuan per day, 
which is equal to or higher than the real cost at the time of the study.  
 
2.3 Experimental design for both studies 
For both two experiments, we used Ngene to generate a D-optimal design (Hensher, Rose, 
and Greene, 2005). Prior information about the parameters is required in D-optimal design 
and was obtained from focus group discussions and four pilot studies of in total 80 
observations.3 The main survey was conducted from May to July 2014. 
 
A D-optimal design is considered more efficient than an orthogonal design since it allows 
parameters to be estimated with minimum variance and enables us to avoid dominance 
between alternatives and extract more information from each respondent with fewer choice 
situations. For both experiments, we generated 12 choice situations with two alternatives in 
each situation. In both situations, the real travel time varies considerably among the 
participants. Thus, we have them separated into two groups: a “long” group for those with a 
travel time of at least 45 minutes in the morning and a “short” group for those with a travel 
time of less than 45 minutes in the morning. Different time and cost levels are used in the 
long and short groups. 
 
  
                                                          
3 The focus group study and the four pilot studies were conducted from July to November 2013. 
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Table 1. Attributes and levels in the two experiments 
  
Attributes  
  
Levels Interpretation 
Long Short 
Study 1: Choice experiment for car commuters 
Morning 6,9,12,15 4,6,8,10 x minutes less than real commuting time 
Afternoon 6,9,12,15 4,6,8,10 x minutes less than real commuting time 
Congestion Charge 10,15,20,25 10,15,20,25 fixed number 
Fuel cost -6,0,8,18 -5,0,5,10 yuan less or more than current level 
Study 2: Choice experiment for public transport commuters 
Morning 6,9,12,15 4,6,8,10 x minutes less than real commuting time 
Afternoon 6,9,12,15 4,6,8,10 x minutes less than real commuting time 
Level of crowding 0 0 6 out of 10 days are severely crowded; otherwise crowded 
1 1 8 out of 10 days are severely crowded; otherwise crowded 
2 2 always severely crowded (today) 
Ticket price 4,6,8,10 4,6,8,10 yuan/day 
 
2.5 The oath script 
A cheap talk script was read to all respondents before moving on to the section with the 
choice situations. 4 The respondents were also encouraged to estimate their behavior without 
any consideration or influence of their opinion about the congestion charge policy.5 Half of 
the respondents were randomly selected using a computer-assistant personal interview (CAPI) 
system (see also Section 3) and then asked to respond to an oath question immediately before 
the choice experiment. The oath script was formulated as follows: “Do you feel you can 
promise us you will answer the questions that will follow truthfully?” The available options 
were “Yes, I promise to answer the questions in the survey truthfully” and “No, I cannot 
promise.” Almost all respondents who received this question answered “yes.” In the analysis, 
we will therefore include all respondents, irrespective of their response to this question.6 
 
  
                                                          
4 The cheap talk script read as follows: “Before making your choices, we would like you to consider how the 
changes will affect you, for example in terms of increased costs. Previous studies of this kind have shown that 
some people tend to overstate that they are willing to change their behavior very easily, while others tend to 
overstate that they are very unwilling to change their behavior.” 
5 The text aimed to encourage respondents to state their behavior regardless of their opinion about the policy 
read as follows: “Furthermore, in this part of the survey, we want you to consider how you would change your 
behavior if the policies were implemented, and not your opinion on what policies should be implemented. So 
irrespective of whether you, for example, think the congestion charge is a good or bad policy, we want you to 
make your choices under the assumption that there is a congestion charge.” 
6 In the first study, 283 of the 290 respondents who received the oath version of the survey said “yes.” In study 2, 
the corresponding share was 354 out of 358. The main results that we will present are not sensitive to whether or 
not we include those who said no. 
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3. Administration of surveys and description of the samples 
The transportation network in Beijing is based on six ring roads with the Forbidden City in 
the center. The area within the third ring road is extremely congested during rush hours, and it 
is also the area that will most likely be subject to the congestion charge scheme, if 
implemented. Therefore, our studies focus on commuters who have to travel across the third 
ring road during rush hour, since they are most likely to be affected by the policy.  
 
The face-to-face interviews were conducted using laptops with a computer-assisted personal 
interviewing (CAPI) system installed. Thus, we could generate individualized choice 
situations for each respondent. Twenty-four experienced enumerators were hired to carry out 
the survey, and this group was provided a training session on the questionnaire and the CAPI 
system.  
 
To find eligible respondents, we used a stratified sampling method with a screening question. 
Thirty-five residential areas and five business districts were chosen. Our sample covers 
commuters living both outside and inside the third ring road.7 Households were randomly 
selected from these places. The number of interviewed households is about 30 for each 
residential area and about 200 for each business district. At the very beginning of each survey, 
a screening question was used to check the eligibility of the selected households. It read: 
“Does any adult household member who is at least 18 years old need to enter inside the third 
ring road during morning/evening rush hours?” If the answer was no, the survey was 
terminated. If there was more than one eligible commuter in a household, we randomly picked 
one of them using the CAPI system as described below. 
 
In total, 1,475 commuters were interviewed in the two studies. The number of completed 
interviews was 1,370 (622 for car owners and 748 for public transport commuters). Twenty-
three observations are dropped due to negative time and cost attribute levels.8 As a result, the 
samples used in the analysis include 605 car commuters and 742 public transport commuters. 
In both studies, 48 percent of the respondents received the oath script; see Table 2.   
 
                                                          
7 Eleven out of the 35 residential developments were located inside the third ring road. Two of five business 
districts were located inside the third ring road, while another two business districts were located outside the 
third ring road. 
8 In our experimental design, the levels of commuting time and fuel cost are pivoted on the current levels. In 
some cases this resulted in negative time or cost levels in the experiment, since for example a respondent could 
have a travel time of less than 10 minutes. These respondents are completely dropped from the analysis. 
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Table 2. Total number of observations 
 Oath No Oath Total 
Study 1: Generic experiment, car commuters 290 315 605 
Study 2: Generic experiment, public transport commuters 358 384 742 
Total 648 699 1347 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of key variables in the sample 
  Oath No Oath 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
Study 1: Choice experiment for car commuters 
Commuting time in the morning minutes 42.41 16.71 44.12 18.33 
Commuting time in the afternoon minutes 48.14 20.65 49.13 19.31 
Commuting time with severe congestion minutes 60.58 27.37 66.50 29.35 
Fuel cost yuan per day 29.16 26.37 29.11 15.65 
Share of respondents with travel time >45 min >45 minutes 0.38  0.43  
Individual income in year 2013 10,000 yuan 7.60 5.71 7.72 7.37 
Share of respondents with high yearly income >70,000 yuan 0.43  0.45  
Attitude towards congestion charge 0 to 10 scale 5.93 2.19 5.75 2.10 
Gender 1=male 0.51 0.50 0.57 0.50 
Age years 36.43 10.41 35.91 10.23 
Share of university level education 1=university 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.48 
Study 2: Choice experiment for public transport commuters 
Commuting time in the morning minutes 48.72 22.28 48.28 19.80 
Commuting time in the afternoon minutes 51.47 21.45 51.31 20.24 
Commuting time with severe congestion minutes 58.36 25.05 59.36 25.87 
Ticket cost yuan per day 3.02 1.80 2.98 1.86 
Share of respondents with travel time >45 min. >45 minutes 0.51  0.50   
Individual income in year 2013 10,000 yuan 5.63 3.03 5.66 3.18 
Share of respondents with high yearly income >70,000 yuan 0.25  0.25  
Gender 1=male 0.40 0.49 0.48 0.50 
Age years 34.63 11.35 34.70 10.86 
Share of university level education 1=university 0.30 0.46 0.27 0.44 
 
The average commuting time is roughly 40 to 50 minutes for both car drivers and public 
transport users, and it is a bit longer in the afternoon than in the morning. In case of severe 
congestion, the travel time can be more than one hour. About 40 percent of the car commuters 
have to spend 45 minutes or more each direction. The corresponding share for public 
transport users is about 50 percent. The daily fuel cost for car commuters is about 30 yuan. A 
daily public transport ticket is considerably cheaper.  
 
As expected, there are some differences between car and public transport commuters. Car 
commuters spend less time but more money on commuting than do public transport users. 
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The average income of car users is higher, and this group also has a large share of high-
income people. A t-test allows us to compare the two groups with and without oath. For car 
commuters, there are no statistically significant differences (at the 95% level) between the 
oath and no oath survey versions for the variables listed in Table 3. For public transport 
commuters, there are slightly more females in the groups that received the oath (Pearson Chi2 
(1) =5.09 and p-value=0.024). 
 
4. Results 
For each of the two experiments, we begin by estimating separate models for the two versions 
with and without the oath script. In all models, we pool the survey versions with short and 
long travel time, since these two versions were primarily implemented to improve the design 
of the experiment. We estimate random parameter logit (RPL) models and report coefficient 
estimates and marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) estimates. In both the car and the public 
transport experiment, we keep the cost attribute fixed, and the remaining attribute coefficients 
are assumed to be normally distributed. We report mean MWTP and the standard deviation of 
MWTP in order to consider the preference heterogeneity in terms of WTP as well.  
 
MWTPs for the time attributes are measured in yuan per minute. We also estimate an MWTP 
for the charge attribute, although this attribute is also a monetary measure. We do this 
primarily to be able to make a direct comparison between the oath and no-oath versions. Since 
both the congestion charge and fuel cost are monetary attributes and measured in Yuan, we 
can also conduct a consistency test by investigating whether the ratio between the charge 
attribute and the cost attribute is one. Moreover, since one of our objectives is to investigate 
whether those answering an oath version of the survey will make more careful choices than 
those not answering an oath survey, we also look at the impact of oath on possible attribute 
non-attendance (ANA). The probabilities of not attending to an attribute in both experiments 
are estimated using a latent class model (LCM); see, e.g., Scarpa et al. (2009). More 
specifically, we estimated an LCM model with five classes, where in four of the classes one 
attribute is not attended to while the others are. All the attributes are attended to in the fifth 
class. Table A1 in the Appendix reports the probabilities of attending to the attributes 
according to the LCM. We find that the probabilities of attending to the attributes are very 
similar in the two versions with and without an oath. Thus, there is no evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that taking an oath makes respondents more attentive to the attributes. However, 
we will still focus our analysis on the RPL where we take attribute non-attendance into 
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account. Thus, using the estimated non-attendance probabilities from the latent class model, 
we estimate RPL models using 1,000 Halton draws. These are presented in Table 4. We report 
coefficient estimates but also MWTP estimates, including standard deviations of the MWTP. 
We also report the p-values from the t-tests MWTPOath – MWTPno oath in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Random parameter models for the choice experiments. Attributes are weighted based on estimated ANA from an LCM. Standard errors 
in parentheses.  
 Car Public transport 
Random 
parameters 
No Oath Oath 
MWTPOath –
MWTPNo Oath 
 No Oath Oath MWTPOath –
MWTPNo Oath 
Coefficient MWTP Coefficient MWTP p-value Coefficient MWTP Coefficient MWTP p-value 
Time morning -0.132*** 
(0.012) 
-0.590*** 
(0.045) 
-0.128*** 
(0.013) 
-0.595*** 
(0.051) 
0.951 -0.086*** 
(0.024) 
-0.122*** 
(0.033) 
-0.116*** 
(0.027) 
-0.161*** 
(0.036) 
0.432 
Time afternoon -0.048*** 
(0.010) 
-0.214*** 
(0.039) 
-0.057*** 
(0.012) 
-0.265*** 
(0.049) 
0.410 -0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.059) 
0.864 
Charge -0.248*** 
(0.016) 
-1.106*** 
(0.053) 
-0.216*** 
(0.016) 
-1.003*** 
(0.056) 
0.183      
Comfort      -0.460*** 
(0.077) 
-0.654*** 
(0.104) 
-0.492*** 
(0.084) 
-0.680*** 
(0.109) 
0.863 
Fixed parameters           
Cost -0.234*** 
(0.010) 
 -0.216*** 
(0.011) 
  -0.704*** 
(0.025) 
 -0.724*** 
(0.026) 
  
Standard 
deviations 
          
Time morning 0.102*** 
(0.014) 
0.456*** 
(0.063) 
0.111*** 
(0.014) 
0.512*** 
(0.068) 
0.544 0.249*** 
(0.031) 
0.354*** 
(0.040) 
0.290*** 
(0.030) 
0.401*** 
(0.050) 
0.458 
Time afternoon 0.042** 
(0.018) 
0.188** 
(0.080) 
0.093*** 
(0.014) 
0.433*** 
(0.062) 
0.015 0.077*** 
(0.019) 
0.110*** 
(0.026) 
0.084*** 
(0.018) 
0.116*** 
(0.024) 
0.937 
Charge 0.178*** 
(0.013) 
0.794*** 
(0.062) 
0.175*** 
(0.013) 
0.810*** 
(0.067) 
0.863     0.495 
Comfort      0.967*** 
(0.074) 
1.374*** 
(0.096) 
1.064*** 
(0.081) 
1.469*** 
(0.100) 
 
No. of groups 315  290   384  358   
No. of 
observations 
3780  3480   4608  4296   
R2 0.198  0.171   0.411  0.411   
*** = significant at 1% level, **= significant at 5% level, and *= significant at 10% level. 
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First of all, all the parameters have the expected signs. For both groups, but especially for 
public transport commuters, travel time reductions are much more important in the morning 
than in the afternoon. In addition, public transport commuters clearly care about the level of 
crowding on board buses and subway trains. The coefficients of the standard deviations are 
significant, revealing that there is unobservable heterogeneity in preferences for the attributes. 
The largest variations seem to be for the charge attribute in the car sample and for the comfort 
attribute in the public transport sample. 
 
For car commuters, the MWTPs for travel time reductions are very similar between the two 
versions, although marginally higher in the version with an oath script. In contrast, the 
MWTP for the congestion charge is slightly lower in the survey version with an oath script. 
Using t-tests, we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal MWTPs between the two versions – 
with and without an oath script – at the 10% level. The estimated standard deviations of 
MWTP are either almost the same or slightly higher in the oath script sample. The difference 
is statistically significant in one case: the standard deviation of the MWTP for travel time 
reduction in the afternoon is significantly larger in the oath version (p-value = 0.015).  
 
In the public transport experiment, the MWTPs are consistently slightly higher in the version 
with an oath script. However, using t-tests we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal MWTPs 
between the two versions – with and without an oath script – for any of the attributes in the 
public transport sample at the 10% level. The estimated standard deviations of MWTP are 
either almost the same or slightly higher in the oath script sample, but again there are no 
statistically significant differences.  
 
Consequently, we find basically no evidence supporting the hypothesis that an oath script 
affects estimated preferences for an attribute; both mean and standard deviation of the 
estimated MWTP are very similar across the two samples. As discussed above, we can also 
compare the preferences for charge and fuel cost. Respondents “should” value a one yuan 
increase in congestion cost the same as a one yuan increase in total fuel cost. Thus, the ratio 
between the attribute coefficients for charge and cost should be one. The estimated ratios are 
close to one in both samples. However, there is a small but statistically significant difference 
between the oath and no oath versions: The MWTP of the charge attribute in the no-oath 
script sample is statistically significantly higher than one (1.106; t-test p-value = 0.047). Thus, 
on average, respondents express a stronger preference against an increase in the congestion 
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charge costs compared with an increase in the fuel price. However, in the version with an oath 
script, the ratio is only slightly above one and not statistically different from one (1.003; t-test 
p-value = 0.958).9 Thus, respondents who answered a survey with an oath script pass our 
“consistency test” about costs, while those in the version without an oath script do not. Since 
the congestion charge is the attribute that is potentially sensitive, and linked to transport 
policy in general, this might not be surprising. It also suggests that the oath script does matter, 
but only at the margin. However, as can be seen in Table 4, the MWTPs of the charge 
attribute in the oath and no oath versions are not significantly different from each other (t-test; 
p-value is 0.183). 
 
5. Discussion 
We designed two choice experiments to investigate WTP for a transport-related good in 
Beijing, China: one for car commuters and one for public transport commuters. In particular, 
we investigated whether taking an oath affects stated MWTP levels and possible attribute 
non-attendance in a choice experiment study. Asking respondents to take an oath before 
participating in a stated preference study is an attempt to use commitment theory to reduce a 
potential problem with hypothetical bias. We found very little evidence that an oath script 
affects respondent behavior in the context of a transport-related good. We could not reject the 
hypothesis of equal MWTPs in the oath and no oath versions at the 10 % significance level. 
Nor did we find any clear differences in the probability of not attending to the attributes. The 
only indication of an effect of taking an oath is that it made the respondents consider the costs 
of fuel and congestion charge in a more consistent way. However, the difference compared 
with the version without an oath was small. Thus, our study does not confirm previous tests of 
an oath script (Jacquemet et al., 2010, 2013; Carlsson et al., 2013; Stevens et al., 2013; De-
Magistris and Pascucci, 2014, and Qin and Shogren, 2017). Previous research has even found 
an effect of an oath script on Chinese respondents (Carlsson et al., 2013 and Qin and Shogren, 
2017), suggesting there are no cultural explanations for the absence of an effect. It is possible 
that our way to ask respondents to answer truthfully is too vague. Previous research show 
however mixed results of the wording of an oath: Qin and Shogren (2017) studied oath in two 
laboratory experiments in China. They found that a promise to swear upon one´s honor (a 
promise script) reduced hypothetical bias in one of the experiments, while not in the other 
one. They then replaced the promise script in the second experiment by a stronger 
                                                          
9 As shown in Table 4 also the MWTPs of charge in the oath and no oath versions are significantly different 
from each other; p-value= 0.183. 
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commitment (a solemn oath) where respondents were asked to swear upon one´s honor and 
found a decrease in hypothetical bias. However, Carlsson et al., (2013) used a promise script 
in China and Sweden and found an effect on respondent behavior.  
 
The lack of an oath effect in the present study could possibly be attributed to an absence of 
hypothetical bias. We are unfortunately not able to test this hypothesis, but it is in line with 
previous findings by Hensher (2010), who in three different CE studies on transport mode and 
ticket type choices did not find any evidence of hypothetical bias. Similarly, Swärdh (2008) 
found no hypothetical bias in willingness to pay for travel time reductions among certain 
subjects. Another hypothesis is that oath scripts simply do not always work, at least not for all 
kinds of goods. It is difficult to compare our results with previous studies since most of the 
previous studies have used different methods, such as laboratory experiments (Jacquemet et 
al., 2010 and 2013; Stevens et al., 2013; and Qin and Shogren, 2017), or CVM: (Carlsson et 
al., 2013). However, De-Magistris and Pascucci (2014) found that an oath script decreased 
hypothetical bias in a CE study but their good was very different from ours, namely food 
(sushi). Thus, despite many positive findings regarding the effects of oaths on hypothetical 
bias, we cannot claim it to be a universal tool to decrease or mitigate hypothetical bias in all 
types of SP studies. It is possible that transport-related goods significantly differ from for 
example environmental goods. More research about the use of oaths in studies on transport-
related goods is clearly needed to address their possible impact. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Probabilities of attending/ignoring attributes; results from an LCM model. 
 Car  Public transport  
 No Oath Oath No oath Oath 
Consider all attributes 0.599* 0.591*** 0 0 
Ignoring morning time 0 0 0.446*** 0.494*** 
Ignoring evening time 0 0 0 0. 
Ignoring congestion charge 0.352*** 0.335***   
Ignoring crowdedness   0.429*** 0.356** 
Ignoring fuel/ticket cost 0.049*** 0.074*** 0.125*** 0.151** 
No. obs. 315 357 377 365 
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.19 0.16 0.49 0.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
